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Fear of Proliferation:
A Nightmare Exception?*
A Response to Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation,
80 U Chi L Rev 1007 (2013).
Annie Deckert
This familiar parade of dreadfuls calls to mind wise counsel:
"Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies;
they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom."
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburgl
INTRODUCTION
In Judging the Flood of Litigation, Professor Marin Levy
provides a novel, comprehensive, and thoughtful analysis of the
nature and legitimacy of judicial floodgates arguments. Judges
rely on the floodgates rhetoric-the idea that "a large number of
new claims"2 might result from a given action-when resolving
cases on their merits or to avoid even getting to the merits.3 Levy
shows that federal courts often rely on the floodgates argument in
* The subtitle riffs on a question that Justice Antonin Scalia posed during oral ar-
guments in a 2012 tax equality case: "You don't believe in the administrative nightmare
exception to the Equal Protection Clause?" Transcript of Oral Argument, Armour v Indi-
anapolis, No 11-161, *26 (US Feb 29, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 642778)
(Scalia).
t Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to the
participants in the 2013 Fordham Scholarship Retreat, including Nestor Davidson, Jen-
nifer Gordon, Abner Greene, Sarah Jaramillo, Joseph Landau, Dean Michael Martin,
and Jed Shugerman, as well as Alex Stein, Jacob Hodes, and Adam M. Josephs and the
other editors at The University of Chicago Law Review, for their insights and editorial
assistance.
1 Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc, 525 US 182, 195 n 16
(1999), quoting Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 169 (Free Press 1990).
2 Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U Chi L Rev 1007, 1009
(2013).
3 See id at 1012-13.
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a self-serving manner, protecting the federal judiciary from
"what they see to be an excessive workload."4
In addition to offering a thorough descriptive account, Levy
develops a framework that helps explain when deploying flood-
gates arguments is more legitimate, such as to protect relations
between the judiciary and the executive 5 or to protect state judi-
cial prerogatives, and less legitimate, such as when used merely
to lighten the federal judiciary's workload.6
Floodgates are an exemplar of a broader category of legal
tropes, here termed "trigger arguments," that raise important
questions about the scope of judicial power. These arguments fo-
cus on an act that triggers subsequent, undesired behavior. In
each case, the court develops rules for monitoring or preventing
the triggering act. Other trigger tropes include "slippery slope"
arguments, which often take a substantive form: the fear, for
example, that permitting Policy A to survive a legal challenge
will increase the palatability of the more extreme Policy B.7 An-
other trigger trope invokes the so-called parade of horribles that
could result from a judicial decision.8
4 Id at 1012. As Levy details, perhaps most concerning is when judges recite the
floodgates fear in order to limit prisoner petitions and thereby reduce their workload.
See Hudson u McMillian, 503 US 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun concurring) ("This audacious
approach to the Eighth Amendment assumes that the interpretation of an explicit con-
stitutional protection is to be guided by pure policy preferences for the paring down of
prisoner petitions. . . . [T]his inherently self-interested concern has no appropriate role in
interpreting the contours of a substantive constitutional right."); note 17 (empirical stud-
ies). This kind of self-serving behavior is not evident in preemption decisions, except in
the more attenuated manner in which judges in preemption cases tend to vote with their
politics.
5 Levy also shows, for example, that getting congressional intent wrong and in-
truding on congressional prerogative are the main reasons to be concerned about flood-
gates in the judicial-legislative context. As shown in Part IIB, the same concerns arise
with regard to the fear of proliferation-but they are not the causes but the effects of its
invocation.
6 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1056-76 (cited in note 2).
7 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv L Rev 1026,
1030-31 (2003); David Enoch, Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You're on
a Very Slippery Slope, 21 Oxford J Legal Stud 629, 630-31 (2001); Mark C. Rahdert,
Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 Am U L Rev 553, 658-59 (2007). This kind of
substantive slippery slope argument has appeared in preemption cases as well. See, for
example, Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature Product Preemption Doctrine: The Uni-
tary Standard and the Paradox of Consumer Protection, 60 Case W Res L Rev 95, 141
(2009) ("Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in [Wyeth v] Levine, expressed the
concern that the Court is on a slippery slope in its preemption analysis.").
8 See, for example, AT&TMobility LLC u Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740, 1747 (2011)
("The Concepcions suggest that all this is just a parade of horribles.").
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This Essay identifies a "fear of proliferation" as another
trigger argument, one endemic to federal preemption decisions9
By fear of proliferation, I mean the fear that courts express that,
if a given subfederal law is permitted to survive the preemption
challenge, similar laws might multiply throughout other juris-
dictions, with negative consequences. While fear of proliferation
arguments resemble floodgates arguments, the underlying con-
cerns are quite distinct.10
Federal preemption doctrine pursuant to the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause" permits federal law to trump state or local
9 Although reciting the proliferation fear in areas as wide-ranging as the climate
change, broadband, Indian crafts, takeovers, music, and housing, scholars have not ana-
lyzed the legitimacy of the proliferation fear itself. See, for example, J.R. DeShazo and
Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change,
155 U Pa L Rev 1499, 1508 n 23 (2007); Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal
Broadband Access as Antitrust and Telecommunications Policy, 55 Am U L Rev 1697,
1703 (2006).
Professor Adam Levitin is the exception. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation:
Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 Yale J Reg 143, 215 (2009) (briefly providing a
critique of the proliferation fear, as discussed at greater length below). And the only at-
tempt found to justify the proliferation fear could quote only a dormant Commerce
Clause case for support. See James B. Slaughter and James M. Auslander, Preemption
Litigation Strategies under Environmental Law, 22 Nat Resources & Envir 18, 19
(Spring 2008), quoting Healy v The Beer Institute, 491 US 324, 336 (1989) ("[T]he practi-
cal effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of
the statute itself, but also by . . . what effect would arise if not one, but many or every,
State adopted similar legislation."). See also C & A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown,
New York, 511 US 383, 406 (1994) (stating a similar principle, though adding this cave-
at: "This is not a hypothetical inquiry. Over 20 States have enacted statutes authorizing
local governments to adopt flow control laws."); Anne Havemann, Comment, Surviving
the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the
Federal Constitution, 71 Md L Rev 848, 855 (2012) (discussing the role of such considera-
tions). It is possible, indeed, that the fear of future proliferation is more relevant in the
dormant Commerce Clause context.
10 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1011 & nn 13-16 (cited in note 2). Aversion of the
floodgates fear appears occasionally in preemption cases, along these lines: if I preempt
this state or local law, it will trigger a wave of preemption litigation. See, for example,
Olson v General Dynamics Corp, 960 F2d 1418, 1424-25 (9th Cir 1991) (Reinhardt con-
curring). Overbroad express preemption provisions, for example in the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), often produce complaints along these
lines. See, for example, Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35
UC Davis L Rev 1, 26 & nn 99-100 (2001) (providing data on the "proliferation" of ERISA
preemption cases); Catherine Fisk, The Last Article about the Language of ERISA
Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 Harv J Leg 35, 59 n 106
(1996).
11 Federal preemption doctrine arises from the US Constitution's Supremacy
Clause, which mandates that "state law must yield to federal law as supreme" if state
and federal law conflict. Robert R.M. Verchick and Nina Mendelson, Preemption and
Theories of Federalism, in William W. Buzbee, ed, Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law,
and Reality of Federalism's Core Question 13, 14 (Cambridge 2009); US Const Art VI, § 2
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law when they conflict.12 Federal law can preempt both statutes
and common law claims. One might assume that if a party chal-
lenges a state or local law or common law claim as preempted,
the court will consider the legality only of that single law.13
But judges cite the fear of future proliferation of that chal-
lenged law in other jurisdictions as one reason to strike down
the law in front of them. In other words, this challenged statute
or common law claim might be permissible on its own-it does
not necessarily require preemption-but if enough other state or
local governments were to enact the same law, or if a multiply-
ing number of private litigants were to bring similar common
law claims, then we would have a preemption problem, and,
therefore, we will strike down this law. The key point is this: it
is not an actual proliferation of subfederal laws or common law
claims, but that possibility, that judges bring to bear on a given
preemption lawsuit. While judges frequently embrace the trope,
they never justify its legal relevance.
Fear of proliferation in preemption cases is a procedural, not
substantive, argument. It is about numbers, about the replica-
tion of something whose multiplication poses a threat, like bac-
teria or a virus. Unlike floodgates, the fear of proliferation stems
from a structural federalism concern: that a future abundance of
state or local laws on a given subject will, in sum, disturb the
balance of powers between the state (or local) and federal gov-
ernments. The solution to the proliferation fear is structural as
well: employ the federal trump card. Preventing future prolifer-
ation means acting prophylactically for the collective good; treat
the individual case disproportionately harshly, like quarantining
("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding."). See also Arizona v United States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2500 (2012)
("From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict
or at cross-purposes.").
12 In addition to the range of preemption cases detailed in Part I, federal preemp-
tion has been employed recently to strike down innovative subfederal environmental
regulations on matters such as hybrid taxicabs and employer-mandated insurance, and
in a range of other cases, such as state tort suits against pharmaceutical and medical
device companies and meat-inspection processes. See, for example, National Meat Asso-
ciation v Harris, 132 S Ct 965, 970 (2012).
13 See, for example, Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941) (addressing an obstacle
preemption claim, and declaring that judges must "determine whether, under the circum-
stances of this particular case, [a state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress") (emphasis added).
134 [80:131
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early viral victims.14 The extent and nature of the political power
disruption is harder to estimate in the preemption context.
Just as the underlying concerns differ, the harms resulting
from the invocation of proliferation and floodgates arguments
differ. Relying on the floodgates fear to foreclose litigation de-
prives individuals of the protection of the laws.15 Treating possi-
ble future proliferation as relevant has the same effect in that
preemption prohibits individuals from bringing certain common
law claims, but preemption also deprives state and local gov-
ernments of being able to enact otherwise legal laws that ex-
press their residents' political preferences.
Part I reveals the fear of proliferation weaving through fed-
eral preemption cases-immigration, environment, and more.
Certain subject matters, indeed, might exacerbate the fear, as
might whether a local or, instead, state law is at issue. Part II
analyzes whether the fear of proliferation is ever a legitimate
argument in the context of both preemption doctrine and consti-
tutional constraints. I suggest that the proliferation concern can
be relevant to a narrow band of federal preemption cases-
certain express preemption claims (those involving federal
preemption provisions enacted because of uniformity concerns)
and to certain obstacle preemption cases (again, those in which
federal uniformity is a congressional goal)-but is rarely, if ever,
relevant to field or impossibility preemption claims. The courts'
act of invoking the fear of proliferation also threatens the sepa-
ration of powers between courts and Congress. It is not that the
sheer number of subfederal laws never matters; in certain cases,
it might matter more than we have been willing to acknowledge.
I. THE FEAR OF PROLIFERATION IN PREEMPTION CASE LAW
The proliferation fear works hard in federal preemption de-
cisions.16 Some judges cite a fear of proliferation as a rhetorical
14 Therefore, preemption here is unlike situations where the prevention targets a
related but distinct act, such as suppressing a speech act to prevent a riot or putting a
finger in the dam to prevent a flood.
15 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1010 (cited in note 2).
16 This pattern of federal judges deploying the fear of proliferation became legible
when I examined dozens of environmental and health and safety preemption cases for a
prior article. See Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State
in Congressional Decision Making, 30 Yale L & Pol Rev 321 (2012) (analyzing the
preemption decisions underlying the empirical analysis in David B. Spence and Paula
Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A
Quantitative Analysis, 87 CalL Rev 1125, appendix A (1999)).
2013] 135
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flourish with no apparent bearing on the actual decision. Others
treat the fear as a contributory factor in the outcome. Still oth-
ers, including in cases of great importance, suggest that the
threat of proliferation is dispositive.17 The goal here is not to
catch every instance in which a federal judge express a fear of
future proliferation but rather to provide a textured account of
representative situations.
A. Tracing the Fear
1. Immigration.
The proliferation fear has surfaced persistently in decisions
responding to the subfederal explosion of immigration-related
laws across the country. Most of these laws can be characterized
as anti-immigrant, or at least as distinctly unfriendly to immi-
grants, particularly undocumented ones.18
17 Levy discusses a similar range of dispositiveness in the context of floodgates ar-
guments. See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1010 n 12 (cited in note 2) ("I am not claiming that
floodgates arguments have been dispositive in all or even most of the cases in which they
have been raised. Rather, I am asserting that this kind of reasoning has directly impact-
ed the outcome of at least a few key cases."); id at 1023 (noting that "[s]imilar rhetoric
surfaces even in cases involving constitutional rights"). See also Elizabeth Weeks Leon-
ard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform,
39 Hofstra L Rev 111, 112 (2011) ("Even if some of the rhetoric [about federalism] is
empty, it has the potential to sharpen the debate and build appreciation for the chal-
lenges of implementing major new policies, while renewing deliberation about the ap-
propriate role of states in federal policymaking and government in individuals' lives.").
The influence of this fear should be no surprise. Descriptive and empirical studies con-
tinue to demonstrate that factors other than doctrinal merits influence preemption out-
comes, whether those factors are federalism principles, political convictions, or other
predispositions. See, for example, Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extra-
textual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?,
5 NYU J L & Liberty 63, 64-66 (2010); Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag, Taking the
Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 Georgetown L J 1,
20 & n 87 (2009); Richard Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U Chi L Rev 695, 705
(2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw U L Rev 727,
729, 741 (2008).
18 See, for example, Lozano u City of Hazleton, 620 F3d 170, 201 (3d Cir 2010) ('[I]n
2009, over 1,500 bills pertaining to immigration were introduced. From these, 222 laws
were enacted, and 131 resolutions adopted."); Karen E. Bravo, On Making Persons: Legal
Constructions of Personhood and Their Nexus with Human Trafficking, 31 N Ill U L Rev
467, 488 (2011) ("This floodtide of legislation is justified under a theory that illegal im-
migration undermines the sovereignty of the United States . . . ."); Gabriel J. Chin, et al,
A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 Georgetown Immig L J
47, 89 (2010) (noting "[t]he stunning proliferation of new state laws"); Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U Chi Legal F 57, 91 (similar); Daniel
Eduardo Guzme'n, Note, "There Be No Shelter Here": Anti-immigrant Housing Ordinanc-
es and Comprehensive Reform, 20 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 399, 401 (2010). In challenging
6
University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 80 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol80/iss1/9
Fear of Proliferation: A Nightmare Exception?
A majority of the Supreme Court presented a strong version
of the proliferation fear in 2012 when striking down parts of Ar-
izona's SB 1070, also known as the Support Our Law Enforce-
ment and Safe Neighborhoods Act: "If § 3 of the Arizona statute
were valid," the Court stated, "every State could give itself inde-
pendent authority to prosecute federal registration violations,
diminishing the Federal Government's control over enforcement
and detracting from the integrated scheme of regulation created
by Congress."19 Justice Scalia in dissent poked at the majority's
invocation of this "looming specter of inutterable horror" and
said that the Court's vision "seems to me not so horrible and
even less looming."20 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted, "The fact
that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some con-
ceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly
invalid, since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment."21 In the de-
cision below on review, the Ninth Circuit had made clear that
the potential for future proliferation affected its judgments when
striking down §§ 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona's SB 1070, using
statements such as the following: "Finally, the threat of 50
states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top
of the INA also weighs in favor of preemption" of Section 2(B),22
and "S.B. 1070's detrimental effect on foreign affairs, and its po-
tential to lead to 50 different state immigration schemes piling
on top of the federal scheme, weigh in favor of the preemption of
Section 3."23 The court repeated that language about all the
states piling onto the federal scheme when finding §§ 5(C)24 and 625
this legislation, plaintiffs have invoked, inter alia, the federal Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952, Pub L No 82-414, ch 477, 66 Stat 163, codified as amended at 8 USC
§ 1101 et seq; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105, most substantially amended by the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986; Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359, codified as amended in
various sections of Title 8; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 8.
19 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2502 (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
20 Id at 2521 (Scalia dissenting).
21 Id at 2515 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted).
22 United States u Arizona, 641 F3d 339, 354 (9th Cir 2011), affd in part, revd in
part, and remd, 132 S Ct 2492 (2012) (affirming on all grounds except holding that state
courts should have a chance to construe § 2(B), particularly in the absence of proof of ac-
tual conflict).
23 Arizona, 641 F3d at 356.
24 Id at 360.
25 Id at 365-66.
2013] 137
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preempted as well. Judge Noonan, concurring, flagged the trope
as problematic.26
The proliferation fear saturated a 2011 district court opin-
ion striking down an Alabama statute that had, in part, prohib-
ited undocumented immigrants from making "any transaction"
with the state government or its subdivisions and prohibited an-
yone else from doing so on behalf of such an "alien."27 The dis-
trict court found the "cumulative effect" of potential future stat-
utes like Alabama's relevant to "the scope of preemption
analysis" and to "why the court's perspective is not only Ala-
bama's law" but also other states' enactments. 28 As the court de-
clared in various iterations throughout the opinion, if the state
"can regulate as it has here, then so could every state or locality."29
The Alabama court quoted a Third Circuit decision, Lozano u
City of Hazleton,30 which itself provided several fear-of-proliferation
arguments. 31 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Third
Circuit's first Lozano decision for reconsideration in light of a
26 See id at 369 (Noonan concurring) ("For those sympathetic to immigrants to the
United States, [the statute] is . . . a chilling foretaste of what other states might attempt.
... It is not our function, however, to evaluate the statute as a symbol.").
27 See Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v Magee, 835 F Supp 2d 1165, 1170 n
2 (MD Ala 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), vacd by Central Ala-
bama Fair Housing Center v Commissioner, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th Cir 2013) (dismiss-
ing appeal as moot after the state amended its statute).
28 Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, 835 F Supp 2d at 1181.
29 Id ("[I]f every State adopted the rental ordinances and manufactured home own-
ership bans seen here, undocumented immigrants' residency in these classes of housing
would be impossible nationwide."). See also id ("[W]e can imagine the slippery slope ... if
every local and state government enacted laws purporting to determine that . . . [per-
sons] could not stay in their bounds. If every city and state enacted and enforced such
laws ... the federal government's control over decisions relating to immigration would
be effectively eviscerated.") (citations omitted).
30 620 F3d 170 (3rd Cir 2010).
31 See id at 213 ("If [this town's] ordinance is permissible, then each and every state
and locality would be free to implement similar schemes."), vacd and remd, City of Hazle-
ton v Lozano, 131 S Ct 2958 (2011) (vacating in light of the decision in Chamber of Com-
merce v Whiting, 131 S Ct 1968 (2011)). See also Lozano, 620 F3d at 221 ("Again, it is not
only Hazleton's ordinance that we must consider. If Hazleton can regulate as it has here,
then so could every other state or locality."). The idea of proliferation itself seems to be
contagious in preemption decisions. The Third Circuit, for example, in turn cited a
Northern District of Texas case that had expressed the proliferation fear. See id at 202,
citing Villas at Parkside Partners v City of Farmers Branch, 701 F Supp 2d 835 (ND Tex
2010). See also Villas at Parkside Partners v City of Farmers Branch, 726 F3d 524, 548
(5th Cir 2013) (Dennis concurring) (providing an extended fear-of-proliferation argu-
ment, quoting the Supreme Court's formula in Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2502, and other
sources that '[i]f [the subfederal provision] were valid, every State could" do the same);
id, quoting Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 161-63 (1989)
(similar).
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recent ruling. On remand, the Third Circuit once again cited the
fear of proliferation and affirmed the district court's decision to
preempt a city ordinance.32
2. Other policy areas.
While immigration law has been the most recent arena in
which fears of proliferation have been cited, it is not alone. Take
state efforts to regulate tobacco: as the Supreme Court declared
in 2008, allowing one state to proceed "would allow other States
to do the same. . . . easily lead[ing] to a patchwork of state [ ]
laws, rules, and regulations."33 The Court struck down provi-
sions of Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law.34
Subfederal environmental laws also have inspired a fear of
proliferation. In its 2004 Engine Manufacturers Association v
South Coast Air Quality Management District35 decision, the US
Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air Act36 preempted
a regional air-quality district's efforts to encourage the purchase
of clean-energy vehicles through emissions requirements placed
on public and private transportation fleets within its jurisdic-
tion.37 The majority reasoned that, because of the potential for
proliferation, it was irrelevant that the single defendant air-
quality district's efforts would have a minor effect: "[I]f one State
or political subdivision may enact such rules, then so may any
other; and the end result would undo Congress's carefully cali-
brated regulatory scheme."38 Lower courts have emphasized that
line when striking down efforts by cities such as New York and
Boston to encourage the use of hybrid taxis.39
And before Congress enacted national health care legisla-
tion, state and local governments had begun entering the field.
One of the most visible such laws, known (accurately or not) as
32 See Lozano u City of Hazleton, 724 F3d 297, 318 (3d Cir 2013) ('If every other
state enacted similar legislation to overburden the lives of aliens, the immigration
scheme would be turned on its head.' ... Accordingly, the housing provisions conflict
with federal law.").
33 Rowe u New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, 552 US 364, 373 (2008).
34 22 Rev Stat Ann §§ 1555-C(3)(C), 1555-D. See Rowe, 552 US at 377.
35 541 US 246 (2004).
36 Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified at 42 USC § 7401 et seq.
37 Engine Manufacturers Association, 541 US at 255-58 (relying on 42 USC
§ 7543(a)).
38 Engine Manufacturers Association, 541 US at 255. But see id at 259, 266 (Souter
dissenting) (relying on the presumption against preemption to disagree).
39 See Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v City of New York, 2008 WL 4866021,
*10 (SDNY 2008); Ophir u City of Boston, 647 F Supp 2d 86, 90 (D Mass 2009).
2013] 139
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the Wal-Mart Act,40 was enacted in Maryland. When striking it
down as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act of 197441 (ERISA), the Fourth Circuit declared that
"[w]ere we to approve Maryland's enactment solely for its noble
purpose, we would be leading a charge against the foundational
policy of ERISA, and surely other States and local governments
would follow."42
The foregoing examples cite the fear of proliferation as a le-
gitimate factor to be considered in a court's reasoning. Part II
excavates a few signs of discontent.
3. Coda on subject matter.
A concluding question is whether the substantive content of
the subfederal law facing federal preemption influences whether
a court invokes the fear of proliferation. For example, immigra-
tion regulations could differ from other subfederal regulation in
a manner that judges find meaningful-viscerally, politically, or
even legally. To give an example: the enactment of an anti-
immigrant subfederal law might seem particularly likely to lead
to an outbreak of similar subfederal anti-immigrant laws be-
cause racism and xenophobia would feed the process. Such an
outbreak, in turn, would make more likely an impermissible
burden on federal regimes. In contrast, a local environmental
building code would not receive the same fodder, and any repli-
cation would occur at a slower, more deliberative pace. The idea,
in other words, is that the fear of proliferation could be more
justified in certain substantive contexts-ones where the crea-
tion of an impermissible burden is more foreseeable.
B. The Relevance of Local Difference
Tracking the proliferation fear in preemption decisions un-
covers another twist: the fear of proliferation seems to be felt
more acutely when a local ordinance, rather than a state stat-
ute, lies on the preemption chopping block.43
40 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md Laws 1, codified at Md Lab & Empl
Code Ann §§ 8.5-101-107.
41 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
42 Retail Industry Leaders Association v Fielder, 475 F3d 180, 198 (4th Cir 2007).
43 This question was teed up in Decker, 30 Yale L & Pol Rev at 352 (cited in note
16) ("[L]ocal laws present a greater threat of proliferation as a matter of sheer numbers.
There are fifty states but thousands of local bodies available to mimic each other.").
140 [80:131
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One reason for this increased fear is the sheer number of lo-
cal jurisdictions, which makes a "nightmare scenario" of prolif-
eration more nightmarish. This twist has appeared in cases in-
volving federal preemption challenges under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,44 Toxic Substances
Control Act,45 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act46
(HMTA), Occupational Safety & Health Act,47 and ERISA.48
Another reason why courts fear local proliferation more
than state proliferation is that some of them believe that local
regulation deserves less deference. And indeed, when courts call
local ordinances a "subterfuge" and a "sham" in federal preemp-
44 Pub L No 80-104, 61 Stat 163 (1947), codified at 7 USC § 136 et seq. See, for ex-
ample, Professional Lawn Care Association v Village of Milford, 909 F2d 929, 931, 934
(6th Cir 1990) (citing the "thousands of regulatory jurisdictions" that potentially could
enter the field, ruining federal uniformity "in the muddle of thousands of local standards
and regulations," making the federal statute "the lowest common denominator in an
equation of infinite variables"); Appendix Volume II, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v
Mortier, Docket No 89-1905, *43 (US filed June 5, 1990) (available on Lexis at 1990 US S
Ct Briefs LEXIS 257) ("[I]f you allowed local governments to set up regulations in this
field, you could have 300 different regulations in the State of Michigan, you could have
every City coming up with a different plan.").
45 Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 (1976), codified at 15 USC § 2601 et seq. See, for
example, Warren County v North Carolina, 528 F Supp 276, 290 (ED NC 1981) ("Were
the Court to approve this ordinance, no doubt the other ninety-nine counties in North
Carolina would quickly enact identical bans."); Rollins Environmental Services (FS), Inc
v Parish of St. James, 775 F2d 627, 637 (5th Cir 1985) (similar).
46 Pub L No 93-933, 88 Stat 2156 (1975), codified at 49 USC § 103 et seq. See, for
example, Consolidated Rail Corp v City of Bayonne, 724 F Supp 320, 331 (D NJ 1989)
("[I]f the present limitations were upheld, could not other municipalities through which
the cars travel, or briefly come to rest, enact similar ordinances . . . generating chaos in
the movement of butane tank cars along their assigned routes?").
47 Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590 (1970), codified as amended at 29 USC § 651 et
seq. See, for example, Environmental Encapsulating Corp a City of New York, 666 F
Supp 535, 540 (SDNY 1987) ("If the adoption of differing worker safety standards in each
of the fifty states would prove inconsistent with [federal standards], the presence of dif-
fering standards in each of the nation's thousands of municipalities would prove a far
greater obstacle to achieving uniformity," but, in a rare instance, not preempting the
challenged law despite citing the fear), affd in part and revd in part, 855 F2d 48 (2d Cir
1988). For another example of a court citing the fear but then ignoring it, see New York
State Pesticide Coalition, Inc v Jorling, 874 F2d 115, 117 (2d Cir 1989) (noting the "con-
cern[ ]" expressed by the New York State Pesticide Coalition on appeal "that other states
will create notification schemes similar to New York's," but then ignoring it).
48 See, for example, Golden Gate Restaurant Association v City and County of San
Francisco, 558 F3d 1000, 1004, 1007-08 (9th Cir 2009) (Smith dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("[I]f our decision in this case remains good law, similar laws will be-
come commonplace, and the congressional goal of national uniformity in the area of
employer-provided healthcare will be thoroughly undermined"; indeed, "while the 'ad-
ministrative burden imposed by a single law may be tolerable, the cumulative burden
could be staggering,"' and, " [i]f upheld, Golden Gate will undoubtedly serve as a roadmap
in jurisdictions across the country on how to design and enact a labyrinth of laws.").
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tion cases, 49 it could seem like special treatment. There is a per-
ception that lower bars exist to enacting local laws than state
laws, and that therefore weaker laws are enacted more easily at
the local level.50
Judges treating local laws more harshly than state laws be-
cause of the fear of local proliferation would conflict with what I
elsewhere call the "conflation axiom"-the rule in federal
preemption cases that courts must treat state and local laws as
equivalents.51 As the Court has declared, "It is [] axiomatic that,
for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality
of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of
statewide laws."52 A district court, in other words, must ap-
proach an Arizona anti-immigrant law as it would one from the
city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania. While courts are constrained,
Congress, in contrast, has certain powers to distinguish between
the state and the local that it should consider wielding more of-
ten in preemption and savings clauses.53
II. DOCTRINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Recently, in Chamber of Commerce v Whiting,54 the Su-
preme Court rendered a decision that explicitly set aside one
party's proliferation argument.55 In doing so, the Court high-
lighted the unsteady foundations of this trope:
The Chamber contends that "if the 49 other States followed
Arizona's lead, the state-mandated drain on federal re-
sources would overwhelm the federal system and render it
completely ineffective, thereby defeating Congress's primary
objective in establishing E-Verify." Whatever the legal
49 Rollins Environmental Services (FS), 775 F2d at 634-35; Spence and Murray, 87
Cal L Rev at 1178-79, 1186-87 & nn 236, 253 (cited in note 16) (speculating that local
laws are preempted more often than state laws because of "the tendency of local govern-
ments to pursue losing cases," or "greater deference" by judges to state laws).
50 See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on
State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv Envir L Rev 67, 80 (2007) (discussing the con-
tagion effect).
51 Decker, 30 Yale L & Pol Rev at 332-34 (cited in note 16).
52 Wisconsin Public Intervenor u Mortier, 501 US 597, 605 (1991) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
53 See Decker, 30 Yale L & Pol Rev at 344-50 (cited in note 16).
54 131 S Ct 1968 (2011).
55 Id at 1986.
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significance of that argument, the United States does not
agree with the factual premise.56
The majority, in other words, ducked-even though Justice So-
tomayor in dissent argued against the Arizona statute explicitly
on the basis of fear of a proliferation of similar laws in other ju-
risdictions.57 Even she, though, provided no elaboration on the
fear's legal justification.
Less-recent decisions also cast doubt on the legal status of
the proliferation argument. Courts have cited the fear of prolif-
eration-made on their own initiative or by parties-and then
ignored it and ruled against preemption; that choice can be seen
as a mild form of critique.58 More directly, the US Supreme
Court in Wisconsin Public Intervenor u Mortierse declared that
the judiciary should not get involved in addressing potential pro-
liferation.60 Instead, "Congress is free to find that local regula-
tion does wreak such havoc and enact legislation with the pur-
pose of preventing it."61 And a Seventh Circuit judge called the
56 Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (upholding part of the Legal Arizona
Workers Act of 2007 (LAWA), Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 23-211, 212, 212.01 (2010)). This
language resembles that in an antifloodgates Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 majority opinion that Levy cites: "Whatever merits these and other policy ar-
guments may have, it is not the province of this Court to rewrite the statute to accommo-
date them." Artuz v Bennett, 531 US 4, 10 (2000) (emphasis added). The Court in Artuz,
and I would say also in Whiting, leaves open the possibility of that argument having "le-
gal significance" in a different case.
57 Whiting, 131 S Ct at 2003, 2007 & n 11 (Sotomayor dissenting):
I cannot believe that Congress intended for the 50 States and countless locali-
ties to implement their own distinct enforcement and adjudication procedures.
Notably, the Government's brief does not state that the E-Verify system could
accommodate the increased use that would result if all 50 States enacted simi-
lar laws. . . . I would hold that federal law impliedly preempts the Arizona re-
quirement.
But see Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1054 (cited in note 2), noting that Justice Sotomayor
was on the opposite side of the floodgates trope in Perry v New Hampshire, 132 S Ct 716,
737-38 (2012) (Sotomayor dissenting) (using the term "flood" to argue that a flood would
not come).
58 See note 47.
59 501 US 597 (1991).
60 Id at 616.
61 Id at 615-16 (rejecting the contagion argument that a small Wisconsin town's
attempt to regulate pesticide use "rais[ed] the specter of gypsy moth hordes safely navi-
gating through thousands of contradictory and ineffective municipal regulations" and
therefore should be preempted).
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proliferation fear "inadmissible," but-unfortunately for our
purposes-did not state why.62
This Part tackles the question of whether the proliferation
fear is legally justifiable under current preemption doctrine and
constitutional principles. Reliance on the proliferation fear, I
conclude, can exceed the confines of preemption doctrine63 and
can run against broader constitutional mandates.
A. Doctrinal Legitimacy
This Section sketches out a framework that courts can adopt
when considering preemption challenges across a range of sub-
stantive areas. The proliferation concern, I suggest, is most rele-
vant to cases that involve express federal preemption clauses
whose goal is uniformity and to so-called obstacle preemption
cases where, again, federal uniformity is a leading goal, but is
rarely if ever relevant to other implied preemption claims.
1. A skeletal overview of preemption doctrine.
Complex doctrines have developed to fill out the relatively
simple commandment of the Supremacy Clause.64 Preemption
claims fall into two major categories: express and implied. Ex-
press preemption doctrine governs those situations where Con-
gress has explicitly prohibited state regulation over a given
62 Brown u Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp, 767 F2d 1234, 1245 (7th Cir 1985) (Cudahy
concurring in part and dissenting in part):
The majority [] speculates that individuals residing adjacent to [] other sites
or state authorities might bring injunctive actions similar to this one, and
jumps to the conclusion that therefore this action is preempted. This approach
is simply inadmissible. The majority is correct to be aware of the possibility of
this conflict, in which the several states bar each of the options approved or
considered by the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]. But so far this conflict is
possible, not actual, and it is sheer speculation to conclude that it will ever
transpire.
(first and third emphases added). See also City of New York v United States Department
of Transportation, 700 F Supp 1294, 1305-06 (SDNY 1988) (rejecting the agency's argu-
ment that if the city prevailed in upholding its scheme against a preemption challenge,
"uniformity would be destroyed and localities would be encouraged to race to export risks
of hazardous materials transportation to their neighbors"; as the court observed, it has
not happened yet).
63 Consider Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1057 (cited in note 2) ("[O]nce situated, the use
of some floodgates arguments becomes fairly easily defensible, while the use of others-
precisely because they are not supported by accepted lines of doctrine and practice-
becomes far more questionable.").
64 See note 11 and accompanying text.
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matter-that is, where federal statutory text explicitly prohibits
subfederal regulation. The rest of the case law-and the bulk of
it -addresses the range of situations in which Congress has not
spoken clearly as to whether it wants to prohibit state law on a
given topic. Courts then take up the task of determining wheth-
er, nonetheless, Congress intended such laws to be preempted
pursuant to implied preemption doctrine.65
Implied preemption claims fall into two main subcatego-
ries-first, field preemption, in which Congress occupies or
squats on an entire field such that states cannot regulate in it,
and second, conflict preemption, which includes both obstacle
preemption66 (where subfederal law stands as an obstacle to the
fulfillment of congressional goals, which essentially constitutes a
judgment call for the courts) and impossibility preemption
(where a party cannot comply with federal law simultaneously
with complying with state or local law).67 Congressional purpose
is seen as the touchstone for deciding preemption cases.68
2. Express preemption and the proliferation fear.
Future proliferation, I suggest, is generally irrelevant to ex-
press preemption claims-those claims asserted pursuant to
Congress having inserted a preemption clause into a statute.
However, proliferation is relevant to express preemption cases
in those rare cases where congressional statements on contagion
65 See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 2011 Utah L Rev 223, 227 ("While these categories may
be helpful in distinguishing the various means by which Congress can signal the scope of
its preemptive intent, they ultimately carry no independent legal significance.").
66 Whether local law constitutes a sufficient obstacle to federal law to require
preemption "is a matter of judgment." Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US
363, 373 (2000). See also Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the
Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 153, 199-204 (2012). Some be-
lieve that obstacle preemption is unconstitutional. See, for example, Note, Preemption as
Purposicism's Last Refuge, 126 Harv L Rev 1056, 1057 (2013); Sharkey, 5 NYU J L &
Liberty at 68-70 (cited in note 17) (describing Justice Thomas's position that "the entire
jurisprudence of obstacle preemption . . . should altogether vanish"). As Justice Thomas
has stated elsewhere, "matters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of fed-
eral judges." Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas concurring).
67 See Ernest A Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 S Ct Rev 253, 273-74 ("Traditionally, the Court
has defined 'impossibility' very narrowly. . . . By contrast, the Court has often defined
,conflicting purposes' or 'obstacle' preemption quite broadly.") (footnotes omitted).
68 Even if an express "savings" clause protects state regulation from express
preemption, the Court recently clarified, the regulation could fall to an implied preemp-
tion challenge. See Geier v American Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861, 869-70 (2000).
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might help elucidate the meaning of plain text, in particular in
the subset of express preemption cases where courts are seeking
clarity on the scope of a preemption clause and the clause was
inserted as part of Congress's effort to establish a uniform fed-
eral scheme. The idea is that uniformity concerns are so closely
related to the number-and potential growth-of regulations
that future contagion is arguably relevant. Under this approach,
the fear of proliferation was more legitimately used in Engine
Manufacturers Association69 than in Whiting.70 Future prolifera-
tion is least likely to be relevant or legitimate where Congress
expressly has set a floor below which state and local regulation
cannot go, or where it has set a maximum standard.71
However, this carve-out that I suggest for cases where Con-
gress has expressed strong uniformity concerns should be con-
sidered in light of the presumption against preemption and the
well-known failings of legislative history.
3. Implied preemption and the proliferation fear.
a) Field preemption. The fear of proliferation should be
stopped at the door in field preemption cases, where the ques-
tion is merely whether Congress has intended to occupy the sub-
ject matter in question. In such cases, it should not matter
whether one or twenty or three hundred subfederal jurisdictions
regulate.
b) Conflict preemption: obstacle and impossibility. In obsta-
cle preemption cases, the first type of conflict preemption ad-
dressed here, plaintiffs argue that federal law preempts state
and local laws because they present an obstacle to federal objec-
tives. The potential for a legal conflagration is relevant to certain
69 For a discussion of the Engine Manufacturers Association approach, see notes
37-38 and accompanying text.
70 Congress indicated that uniformity was a leading goal of the Clean Air Act
preemption provision employed in Engine Manufacturers Association. The same is true
for many federal immigration provisions, but employment is different, as the majority in
Whiting noted while upholding the LAWA: "Congress expressly preserved the ability of
the States to impose their own sanctions through licensing; that-like our federal system
in general-necessarily entails the prospect of some departure from homogeneity." Whit-
ing, 131 S Ct at 1979-80.
71 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 NYU L Rev 1547, 1559 (2007) (describing a "unitary federal
choice ceiling"). See also id at 1558 ("[A] 'true ceiling' is analytically possible but appears
to be virtually nonexistent in the law.").
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types of obstacle preemption claims: those where uniformity was
a leading goal of Congress's in enacting the statute. For exam-
ple, parties challenge subfederal immigration regulation on field
and express preemption grounds, but most frequently they do so
on obstacle preemption grounds because there are few express
preemption provisions and because uniformity is generally,
though not always, such an important federal goal with immigra-
tion law.72 For example, Congress clearly expressed its uniformity
goals when enacting the HMTA.73 Many of these decisions are re-
solved on obstacle preemption grounds, citing the proliferation
fear in a manner that is more acceptable than in other contexts.74
As with field preemption, the threat of contagion is irrele-
vant to implied impossibility preemption claims. In such cases,
the question is whether a party simultaneously can comply with
both state and federal law-and if the answer is no, then the
state law is preempted. Future proliferation is not meaningful to
that question.
4. Preemption presumptions.
Preemption should be exercised rarely and cautiously, as a
matter of constitutional law and because of the functional im-
portance of state power, localism, and multiplicity.75 Further,
applying general presumptions against preemption76 and clear
72 Cristina Rodriguez, Muzaffar Chishti, and Kimberly Nortman, Testing the Lim-
its: A Framework for Assessing the Legality of State and Local Immigration Measures,
1916 PLI/Corp 195, 208 (2007) (describing the rarity of express, field, and impossibility
preemption claims in immigration cases, and noting that "most cases become obstacle
preemption cases").
73 See, for example, Colorado Public Utilities Commission v Harmon, 951 F2d 1571,
1575 (10th Cir 1991) ("Congress [] strongly reaffirmed that uniformity was the linchpin
in the design of the statute."). But see Colorado Pyrotechnic Association v Meyer, 740 F
Supp 792, 796 (D Colo 1990) (not identifying uniformity as Congress's main concern in
enacting the HMTA, but instead identifying risk prevention).
74 See Colorado Public Utilities Commission, 951 F2d at 1580, 1582 (citing Con-
gress's concern about the "potential for unreasonable hazards in other jurisdictions and
confounding shippers and carriers which attempt to comply with multiple and conflicting
... requirements").
75 Federal agency preemption should be exercised even more rarely. See David S.
Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 Vand L Rev 1125, 1190-91 (2012) (arguing that
agencies should not have the power to create preemptive-supreme-federal law).
76 The so-called presumption against preemption means that Congress must
demonstrate its "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt subfederal law, particularly
when states are regulating in areas where they traditionally have exercised their author-
ity. Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 (1947).
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statement rules helps reflect our constitutional structure. 77
These approaches reflect the weightiness of federal intrusions on
state authority, particularly in areas in which states traditional-
ly have exercised their authority.78 At least as far as an anti-
preemption principle goes, Congress seems to agree. 79
Relying on the proliferation fear works against the pre-
sumption against preemption by placing a thumb on the scale in
favor of the court finding preemption.80 The longevity and shape
of the presumption against preemption is in doubt, and some
courts have backed away from it.81 Nonetheless, it still has a
strong toehold in doctrine and the literature, often cited as
among the leading judicially created doctrines protecting struc-
tural federalism and taking its place among a set of clear state-
ment rules that courts have developed to hand back responsibility
to Congress.82
77 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Public Values in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 137 U Pa L Rev 1007, 1019, 1023 (1989) (describing the presumption against
preemption as one of the "meta-rules," which are "general rules of statutory interpreta-
tion that reflect the gravitational force of constitutional values"). Consider Merrill, 102
Nw U L Rev at 741 (cited in note 17) ("[T]he presumption against preemption is honored
as much in the breach as in observance.").
78 See, for example, Young, 2011 S Ct Rev at 254 (cited in note 67) (noting that
"[t]he doctrine of preemption, grounded in the Supremacy Clause rather than in Article
I's scheme of limited and enumerated powers, is the key instrument by which the law
manages this overlap" between federal and state power in our contemporary federalist
structure emphasizing concurrency instead of exclusive dual sovereignty); William Funk,
Preemption of Federal Agency Action, in Buzbee, ed, Preemption Choice 214, 230 (cited in
note 11) (rooting the presumption against preemption in this principle).
79 See, for example, William W. Buzbee, Introduction, in Buzbee, ed, Preemption
Choice 1, 10 (cited in note 11) (noting that "nonpreemptive regimes," however, "remain
the dominant political choice").
80 See Levitin, 26 Yale J Reg at 215 (cited in note 9) (criticizing the Court's em-
ployment of the proliferation fear in Engine Manufacturers Association as "run[ning]
contrary to the standard presumption against [ ] preemption"). Using the phrase "slip-
pery slope" in the way that the "fear of proliferation" is used here, Levitin marks the
holding as being "founded on a dubious concern about a slippery slope of regulation,"
without which "the Court would have to engage in the [merits] analysis proposed in Jus-
tice Souter's dissent." Id.
81 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225, 290-303 (2000). But see Young,
2011 S Ct Rev at 310-32 (cited in note 67) (providing a vigorous defense of the presump-
tion against preemption based on concurrency).
82 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger and Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption
of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 Fordham L Rev 1715, 1720-21
(2013) ("Clear statement rules represent yet another method of statutory construction
with a deep connection to constitutional norms.").
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B. Overextending the Scope of Judicial Power
Judicial reliance on the fear of proliferation also overex-
tends the scope of judicial power, putting pressure on the sepa-
ration of powers between courts and Congress.
Congress can respond to what it sees as the proliferation of
state and local regulation or excessive common law claims by
enacting preemptive statutory provisions.83 And Congress can
act prophylactically when it foresees problems of proliferation or
has set uniformity as a leading goal of some form of federal regu-
lation. The question is to what extent courts can act in this
manner-not by creating prophylactic doctrine per se but in-
stead by acting prophylactically to prevent some future political
phenomenon.
The answer is that they likely cannot. Congress is responsible
for legislation,84 and the Supremacy Clause recites as relevant
the laws of the United States made pursuant to the Constitu-
tion, not judicial speculation about potential future burdens.
This is not a situation where judicial supremacy matters.85 It is
an example of positive legislation making by judges. While no
one who has an ounce of legal realist in her thinks that Thomas
Jefferson's idea of the judge as a "mere machine" is feasible,86
there are limits to positive legislation making by judges.87
But, one objection goes, courts and Congress are engaged in
a fruitful dialogic relationship regarding protecting constitutional
83 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1069 (cited in note 2) ("Specifically, our constitu-
tional system gives Congress the authority to adjust laws so as to stem that flow."). But
see Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr, Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown in Our Constitutional
System, 84 Tulane L Rev 1143, 1152 (2010) (arguing that Congress historically has not
thought sufficiently or systematically about the preemptive effects of federal statutes, so
the task falls to the courts).
84 See, for example, National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S
Ct 2566, 2579 (2012) ("Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret
the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.
Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders."); Hepburn v Griswold, 75
US 603, 611 (1869) (similar).
85 For more on when judicial supremacy does matter, see Barry Friedman and Erin
F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111
Colum L Rev 1137, 1140 (2011) (providing historical and theoretical answers to the "puz-
zle [of] how judicial supremacy gains traction").
86 See Laurence P. Claus and Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Courts as "Positive
Legislators" in the United States, 58 Am J Comp L 479, 480 & n 5 (2010) (citation omit-
ted).
87 Id at 481 ("We need to ask ... not 'was this positive legislation?' but 'to what ex-
tent was this positive legislation?"').
2013] 149
19
Decker: Fear of Proliferation: A Nightmare Exception
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
values.88 However, the most important constitutional values
protected in the preemption context are matters of structural
federalism, not interbranch relations, with the Court applying
doctrines such as the presumption against preemption to ensure
that Congress does not unwittingly or lazily run roughshod over
state and local interests-although even those rules are argua-
bly more about getting Congress's intent right (canons of inter-
pretation) than about pure protection of the proper federal-state
boundary.89 Second, just because an observation has descriptive
traction does not make it normatively desirableo or legally
sound.
Judges invoking the proliferation fear are not as sensitive to
the executive's interests, or even the judiciary's, as in Levy's
floodgates situation-and perhaps those interests are less at
stake. Courts more often employ the floodgates argument in an
other-regarding manner. They justify citing the floodgates fear
by invoking separation of powers considerations and concerns
for state courts.91 Those invoking the proliferation fear often, in-
stead, create tension with separation of powers and state inter-
ests. Rejecting the fear of proliferation therefore is supported by,
if not compelled by, independent constitutional principles.
In a sense, then, this overextension of judicial power by em-
ploying the proliferation fear as a factor in preemption decisions
resembles a justiciability problem, buttressing the suggestion
that the proliferation fear is an illegitimate consideration in
most slices of federal preemption cases. Judicial power is limited
to deciding cases involving redress or to "prevent actual or im-
minently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official
88 See, for example, Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 Ala L Rev 801,
805 & n 11 (2012); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpreta-
tion, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 Georgetown L J
1119, 1122 (2011) (discussing the integration of normative theories about separation of
powers into theories of statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers
as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv L Rev 1939, 1942 (2011) (similar).
89 See, for example, Pursley, 63 Ala L Rev at 803 (cited in note 88) ("Federalism-
related concerns about the constricting effects of preemption on state regulatory authori-
ty partially justify the presumption, but federalism norms are not its direct object. The
presumption is an interpretive canon.") (emphasis omitted).
90 See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw U L Rev 1, 60-61 (1990) (citing these arguments, and then
rejecting them in favor of a role for courts in deciding the scope of their jurisdiction un-
der Article III). But see F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 60 Ala L Rev 895, 936-39 (2009) (rejecting the dialogic approach).
91 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1012 (cited in note 2) (providing a thorough account-
ing of how interbranch concerns shape the form that the floodgates argument takes).
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violation of law."92 While the plaintiffs might have presented a
case or controversy, 93 and while they might have standing to
challenge a given state or local law,94 when judges cite future
contagion elsewhere as a reason to resolve the merits against
that state- or local-government law, the facts underlying that
consideration are purely hypothetical. Federal courts can issue
only temporary injunctions when faced with little information
and projected consequences, and federal courts cannot issue ad-
visory opinions9 Reliance on the fear of preemption can also be
seen through the lens of ripeness problems. Ripeness requires
an inquiry into whether the "harm asserted has matured suffi-
ciently to warrant judicial intervention."96 Although consequen-
tialist reasoning is part of the judicial toolbox, duly enacted
state and local laws can only be struck down on a full considera-
tion of concrete facts or imminently threatened harm. The Su-
preme Court has imported these principles to preemption, de-
claring, as Lozano summarized, that "it is clear that solely
'hypothetical conflicts' between state and local enactments
and federal law are usually insufficient to support a finding of
preemption."97
C. Pushing against Structural Federalism
The very bones of the Constitution support a balance of
powers between the state and federal governments in order to
92 Summers v Earth Island Institute, 555 US 488, 492 (2009).
93 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1. See also, for example, Mistretta v United States, 488
US 361, 385 (1989) ("According to express provision of Article III, the judicial power of
the United States is limited to 'Cases' and 'Controversies. In implementing this limited
grant of power, we have refused to issue advisory opinions or to resolve disputes that are
not justiciable.") (citation omitted); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 498 (1975) (similar).
94 Residents of the given state or locality that enacted an arguably preempted law
might face real injury from enforcement of that law.
95 This Essay looks beyond the Supreme Court to inspect lower federal court opin-
ions but does not turn to state court opinions. Levy, on the other hand, focuses on the US
Supreme Court. See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1001 n 13 (cited in note 2). As courts of
general jurisdiction, state courts can and do entertain federal preemption claims. Per-
haps the fear of proliferation operates differently in the context of state courts: their
standing requirements are typically looser than those of federal courts, and advisory
opinions are generally permissible, for example. However, as a matter of structural fed-
eralism, a state court employing the proliferation fear to strike down a state or local law
on federal grounds would raise similar concerns.
96 Warth, 422 US at 499 n 10. See also Morgan v McCutter, 365 F3d 882, 890 (10th
Cir 2004) ("Like standing, the ripeness inquiry asks whether the challenged harm has
been sufficiently realized at the time of trial.").
97 Lozano, 620 F3d at 203 n 25, citing Schneidewind v ANR Pipeline Co, 485 US
293, 310 (1988).
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secure liberties and freedoms to citizens.98 In the Supreme
Court's view, protecting state sovereignty is not an end in itself;
the goal is to protect individuals.99 Structural federalism does so
in two ways: first "by protecting the integrity of the governments
themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all
governmental powers are derived."100 As part of that structure,
the Supremacy Clause can come down with force on state law.101
Some see preemption already as "an arrow to the heart of struc-
tural federalism."102 Whether or not preemption cases are con-
sidered "constitutional" as opposed to purely statutory cases,
they implicate the deepest federalism concerns. 103
Reliance on the fear of proliferation is a one-way ratchet,
giving more power to the federal government at the expense of
the state or local governments. The text of the Supremacy
Clause says nothing about giving more weight to the federal
government in the case of hypothetical conflicts.104 While the
body of implied preemption doctrine, plus the canons of statuto-
ry interpretation employed in express preemption cases, extends
the bare constitutional text, we should place thoughtful limits
on just how far to extend it.
98 See, for example, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, E. Duncan Getchell Jr, and Wesley G.
Russell Jr, State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, but Not Forgotten, 64 Stan L
Rev 89, 95 (2012). See also generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fi-
delity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev
1733 (2005). But see John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 122 Harv L Rev 2003, 2009 (2009) (providing the strict textualist
critique of such a thing as "federalism doctrine").
99 See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 181 (1992) ("[T]he Con-
stitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself.").
100 Bond v United States, 131 S Ct 2355, 2364 (2011).
101 See Pursley, 63 Ala L Rev at 814 (cited in note 88) (stating that the constitution-
al federalism design, in its barest form, "requires simply that there be both federal and
state governments and suggests that federalism doctrine should prevent actions that
would undermine that basic federalist structure"). See also id at 804 & n 8 (citing New
York, 505 US at 157, as "holding that federalism norms must be enforced 'even if one
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone"').
102 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or
Creeping to Clarity?, 45 Tulsa L Rev 197, 226 (2009).
103 Young, 2011 S Ct Rev at 257 (cited in note 67) (noting that while preemption
cases are "generally exercises in statutory construction" and have only recently been cat-
egorized as constitutional, "the construction of federal statutes plays a critical role in our
federal structure").
104 See note 11 and accompanying text.
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D. Remaining Questions
Both this Essay and Judging the Flood of Litigation leave
room for future research. What happens when dissents invoke
tropes such as floodgates and the fear of proliferation? How can
courts accurately forecast whether the predicted and feared out-
comes will result from pulling the trigger? Should judges provide
more of an empirical explanation when they rely on the trigger
fear as a factor?105 How can we better apply literatures such as
pragmatic utilitarianism, "brass-tacks pragmatism,"106 rule con-
sequentialism, and theories on prophylactic action? Are state
courts applying these tropes?107 What more can we learn about
state/local difference by examining the operation of these trigger
arguments?108
Mechanisms for alleviating the fears underlying these ar-
guments also deserve further study. Procedure, for example,
might play a role. Levy identifies the tools of case dismissal,
summary judgment, and Rule 11 sanctions as better mecha-
nisms than floodgates for controlling caseload.109 To cabin the
improper use of the proliferation fear, courts could knock cases
out on ripeness grounds or could stay cases in order to see if the
predicted proliferation occurs, preserving the status quo as a de-
fault and waiting on merits. Relevant state authorities could be
brought into the case if the anticipated proliferation begins to
occur; in other words, consequentialist reasoning can become
dispositive once courts have held the case in abeyance and per-
mitted the laws to multiply.
105 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1074 (cited in note 2) ("[W]e should expect the jus-
tices to have some extended discussion about why they think a flood is likely to come.");
id (concluding that "if a particular decision is made to avoid an influx of cases that could
harm a coordinate branch of government or state court, then it should be based on some-
thing more than the suggestion that an 'avalanche' or 'flood' is imminent."). See also id at
1075 ("[T]he Court's task goes beyond mere forecasting.... [T]he justices must still
make a determination about whether the figure will truly be problematic.").
106 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 Harv L Rev
1640, 1641 (2012).
107 See note 95 and accompanying text.
108 See Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1028 (cited in note 2), citing Abbe R. Gluck, Inter-
systemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale
L J 1898, 1906 (2011).
109 Levy, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1070 (cited in note 2).
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CONCLUSION
When adjudicating preemption claims, courts at times
weigh the fact that deciding not to preempt the challenged state
or local law will encourage other state and local governments to
pass similar laws that, cumulatively, will harm federal inter-
ests. And then courts rely on that mere possibility-termed here
a fear of proliferation-to strike down the law in front of them.
Courts' unexamined invocation of this trope is concerning. In
contrast, potential proliferation is a legitimate concern for Con-
gress when it enacts preemptive legislation.
Like floodgates, the fear-of-proliferation phenomenon com-
bines the psychology of fear with a rhetorical form, creating both
doctrinal and constitutional problems. While these legal tropes
are understandable, they are not always legally justifiable. The
best justification for the invocation of future proliferation is that
it protects, prophylactically, the balance of powers between state
and federal governments. But that structural argument also
works against its invocation: it unduly cramps state and local
powers otherwise protected by the Constitution, falls, with nar-
row exceptions, outside of the federal preemption doctrinal rules
that have grown on top of their constitutional foundation, and
lies in tension with justiciability principles. A thumb is placed
on the scale in favor of federal interests that requires justifica-
tion or removal.
154 [80:131
24
University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 80 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol80/iss1/9
